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ABSTRACT
BEYOND CHESS; THE EFFECTS OF ANGER ON
PERSON PERCEPTION
May 1997
DANIEL L. SHAPIRO, B.A., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Susan T. Fiske
An experiment examined the effects of anger On people's information processing strategies
regarding a target they had already individuated. Participants read information about an alleged female
student, were induced into either a neutral or angry affective state, and rated the target on several trait
dimensions. In general, affect influenced both recall speed and the extremity of ratings about a person one
had already individualized More specifically, the results of the study suggest that angered ingroup
participants (other females) rate an ingroup target faster and less extremely than neutral ingroup
participants; conversely, angered outgroup participants (males) rate a target more slowly and more
extremely than neutral outgroup participants.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A Quote From the Rei^ninojWorid Chess Ch.mpinn
Every computer has a fixed set of priorities The <:nW ti,»
This quce ,s by Gary Kasparov, ,he reigning world chess champion, describing his la.es, chess
challenge: An IBM technician following instructions from the world's most sophisticated chess machine
(New York Times, Feb. 1996, A27:2).
The Coffee Shop : An Example of the Role of Anger in Perrpptinn
A young man of some intelligence and sophistication recently described an incident he
experienced at a coffee shop while on a blind date. He met his date at a predesignated area of the coffee
shop and, before even greeting her, immediately noted that she looked like a very warm, sensitive woman.
To break the initial awkwardness of their meeting, he suggested that they play chess; she agreed. Two
hours of intense competition commenced, in which he discovered, contrary to his initial impression, that
although she was charismatic, she certainly was not sensitive. In fact, in the middle of a close game, she
muttered in passing that she thought he cheated. Agitated by the critical comment, he responded sharply,
and a back-and-forth volley of bickering ensued. As they became increasingly flustered and flared, they
fired more and more insults and jabs at each other: She called him a "typical lying male," and he
responded by calling her an "irrational, oversensitive woman." Suddenly, the manager of the coffee
house appeared at their table and quietly asked them to leave. They immediately apologized for the
commotion, looked at each other, and puzzled over what overwhelming force influenced their irrational
antics.
The present paper attempts to reconcile the confusion felt by this man and his date by
illuminating the role anger plays in how we perceive others. When angry at someone such as a friend,
date, or spouse, do many of us neglect our personalized notions about that person and instead draw on
negative stereotypic information? Why?
1
Information
In many everyday circumstances, people can choose from a wide range of information processing
strategies for making social judgments, including effortful analytic processing and effort-minimizing
strategies (Bless, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992: Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Forgas. 1992b). However, anger
and other high-arousal emotions may reduce the accessibility of certain information processing strategies,
clouding cognitions and subsequent perceptions of individuated others. For example, anger may have
influenced the young man and his date to ignore their imerdependent goals (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990) and
unique, individualized views of one another and resort to stereotypic judgments.
While several researchers (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Paulhus & Lim,
1994) who study the impact of affect on social judgments have tried to empirically answer the question,
"If a person is experiencing a specific type of affect, how will social information be initially processed?",
the present study attempts to answer the question, "If a person already has an individualized, attribute-
based view of another person, how does anger affect retrieval of that information?" (See Table 1.)
Table I
.
Comparison of paradigms for studying person perception and social judgment.
1. Affect induction™>Individuating/Categorical Information Stored—>Task—>Information Recalled
2. Individuating/Categorical Information Stored—>Affect Induction—>Task—>Information Recalled
Note. Method 1 is the typical paradigm, whereas Method 2 is the paradigm used in the present study.
Specifically, the present paper investigates how anger affects retrieval of attribute-based and stereotypic
information. To first set the stage for understanding retrieval of memories about others, contemporary
models of information-processing that relate to affect are reviewed, and limitations of the models are
discussed. Second, a theoretical explanation of the relationship between negative emotional arousal and
memory retrieval processes is proposed, and the role of anger in memory retrieval processes is illustrated.
Third, five hypotheses are proposed and an experimental method is described to test specific relationships
between anger and the recall of categorical and attribute-based information. Lastly, the results of the
experiment are reported and discussed.
2
Definitions of Terms
Because research on affect has been investigated from many different theoretical perspectives
(e.g., see Russell & Fehr, 1994), it is important to clearly define certain terms used throughout this paper.
Affect is a broad, generic term that refers to moods, emotions, preferences, and evaluations (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991). Moods are enduring, low-intensity mental states with no salient causal target (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991; Forgas, 1992a, p.230). In other words, moods are general feeling states (e.g., feeling good
or feeling lousy) and are not typically directed toward an individual. Emotional arous.l refers to a
cognitive state that is accompanied by physiological arousal (i.e., activation of the sympathetic nervous
system) and the perception of that arousal (Berscheid, 1983). For example, according to some theorists
(e.g., Bersheid, 1983), for angry individuals to be considered emotionally aroused, they must have a
racing heartbeat, realize their heart is racing, and think they are angry and in a state of displeasure.
Neither physiological arousal nor a cognitive state alone constitutes emotional arousal. As shown by
pancultural research (Osgood, May, &. Miron, 1975), these qualifications on the definition of emotional
arousal, particularly the dimensions of displeasure and arousal, are fairly universal.
A distinction also needs to be made between categories, schemas, attributes, individuated
information, and stereotypes. Categories refer to cognitive structures that contain examples or prototypes
of people, social roles, and social situations; categories reduce the complexity of the world by allowing
one to apply general knowledge and expectations without the need for confirmation and validation (Fiske
& Pavelchak, 1986). Examples of categories include men, women, Caucasians, African-Americans, Jews,
and Christians. A schema is an organization of generic knowledge about a concept or category that can be
applied to the understanding of new information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Schemas are organized through
a network of associated elements all having a strong link to a categorical label and weaker links to one
another (Crockett, 1988; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). The weaker links connected to the categorical label
are attributes , which can be either category-consistent or category-inconsistent. Category-consistent
attributes support the meaning of the category. For example, before meeting his date, the young man at
the restaurant noted that his date seemed sensitive, a quality consistent with his categorical expectation of
women. On the other hand, category-inconsistent atfributes allow unexpected, discrepant information to
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be processed, thereby making possible unique, individuated perceptions of others. Thus, the young man
developed an individualized perception of his date upon noting her confrontational style of behavior, an
attribute inconsistent with his conception of women in general. Because a category has more and stronger
links to the attributes than they do with each other, the categoiy will play a more influential role than any
single attribute (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). Stereotypes are schemas that contain culturally- or socially-
determined descriptions and expectations of people, social roles, and social situations; stereotypes can be
.
positive, negative, or neutral in valence. In Western societies, for example, women are stereotypically
perceived as nurturing, while men are stereotypically viewed as agentic. Stereotypes allow people quickly
and easily to infer attributes for others based on meaningful categories (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen,
1994). Generally, social stereotypes are well-developed categories (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and the
information contained within them is more likely to be recalled than the weakly-linked category-
inconsistent information (O'SuUivan & Durso, 1984; Stangor& McMillan, 1992).
Not All That Seems Rational Is Rational:
Modeling the Effects of Emotions on Person Perception and Social Judgment
Researchers have long focused on the effects of affect on person perception and social judgment
(e.g., Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954; Razran, 1940), although most work has been accomplished within the past
decade or so (Forgas, 1995). Specifically, most work recent work examines the development of
comprehensive theoretical models that account for the complexity of affective and cognitive influences on
perception and judgment. Fiske and Neuberg ( 1 990) provide a continuum model of impression formation,
which suggests that when forming impressions, people initially automatically categorize others. When
motivated to attend to the other person, they attempt to confirm the categorization by attending selectively
to expectancy-consistent information. If the categorization confirmation is not successful, they attempt to
recategorize the person, generating a new type of category or a subcategory. When people find it
cumbersome to recategorize, they proceed piecemeal, attribute by attribute, through the data (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991 ). Essentially, when motivated to individuate someone, people move away from categorical
impressions, attending increasingly to expectancy-consistent and -inconsistent attributes. Moderating
variables between these polar strategies of impression formation include an accuracy motive , in which one
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strives for an accurate impression of another (e.g., because of interdependent goals), and cognitive
overload, in which limited cognitive capacity provides mental limitations on the extent of impression
formation.
Although the Fiske and Neuberg (1990) model offers little explicit mention of the role of affect
on social perceptions and judgments, one can extrapolate from their model several points along the
continuum at which affect influences people's impression formation strategies. Research suggesting that
affect affects the accessibility of cognitive categories has sfrong implications for impression formation
(e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). The degree of accessibility of social categories available to a perceiver
can influence which of many categories is used to perceive a target (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). One factor
that influences accessibility of social categories is affect: Categories are more likely to be accessed when
one is in a mood cognitively linked with that category (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984). For example, when a
person is in a positive mood, targets will typically be categorized with respect to their positive features
(Erber, 1985, in Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). As noted
,
once categorization of a target has occurred,
motivation determines where along the continuum people halt information processing. High levels of
goal-related emotional arousal often correspond with high levels of motivation toward reaching that goal.
That is, people who are emotionally invested in goals often feel concomitant motivation for reaching those
goals. For example, a woman attracted to a man and interested in meeting him -- thus having goal-related
emotional arousal -- would possess more motivation and understand his unique attributes than a woman
who experiences no such emotional arousal. However, extremely high or low levels of emotional arousal
may undercut movement toward piece-meal processing. For instance, individuals who are extremely
angry may not be able to process social information efficiently, relying instead on categorical information.
(This last idea is expanded later in this paper.)
Most research employing the continuum model of impression formation (Fiske &. Neuberg,
1990) assumes that social perception operates unidirectionally from schema-driven to data-driven
processing; hence, the social perceiver cannot revert to automatic categorical processing of an
individuated person. For example, after the young man in the opening example began individuating his
date and storing unique attributes about her in memory (e.g., she is charismatic, not nurturing, and so on).
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he could no, merely erase .ha. i„fo™a.io„ „„ce he became angered and shou.ed s.ereo.ypic, ca,egor,cal
mforma.io„. Because ca.egorical and individua.ing informa.ion bo.h are comained wUhin memory
s.orage. utiliza.ion of either We of informa.ion may depend on specific reMeval facors implici. in .he
Fiske and Neuberg ( 1 990) con.inuum model: Categorical and individuared memorial informa.ion may be
differemially accessible and retrieved. Thus, once angered, ,he man on ,he da.e may have focused on
ca.egorical information and associated stereotypes rather than on attribute-based informa.ion, Bu. what
factors may induce this effect?
Forgas (1995) offers a theoretical account of the role of affective states in social judgment with
the Affect Infusion Model (AIM). Affect inftision refers to the process by which affective information in
memory influences and is a part of the judgmental process and outcome. According to the AIM (Forgas,
1992a; Forgas, 1995), people making social judgments have four available information-processing
strategies, each of which has specific circumstances for usage. Whereas the continuum model (Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990) synthesizes information processing strategies into one cohesive continuum of impression
formation, the AIM discriminates between discrete processing strategies. The first information-processing
strategy, low in affect-infusion, is called direct access , and is based on "preexisting, crystallized
judgments." This process of social judgment is most likely when: (a) the target is familiar and has highly
prototypical features that cue an already-stored and accessible judgment, (b) the judge has no personal
involvement, and (c) cognitive, affective, motivational, or situational influences do not mandate more
elaborate processing. In contrast, according to the continuum model (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), initial
categorization is not always a dead-end information processing strategy: After initially categorizing a
person, one can allocate attention to target attributes. Thus, a direct access stereotype such as a pre-
formed belief would be immutable, capable of reconstruction only through use of a different processing
strategy; conversely, the continuum model posits that stereotypes have the potential to be disconfirmed
through individuating information.
The second information-processing strategy, also low in affect-infusion, is termed motivated
processing . This strategy is used when strong, specific motivations press for a specific judgmental goal.
Motivated processing is based on the assumption that people can use specific, preexisting preferences to
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guide their search for information, as well as their judgments. Consequently, social judgment is based
upon a partial, guided search of information.
Motivated processing closely resembles Kruglanski's theory of lay epistemics (1989). The
theory posits that knowledge is reached through a process of hypothesis generation and hypothesis
validation, concluding when one reaches cognitive clo.sure. Cognitive closure is the adoption of a
judgment that resolves ambiguity and questioning. In specific types of situations, people's need for
cognitive closure may be heightened by motivational factors, and the epistemic process may terminate
more quickly. For example. Ford and Kruglanski (1995) demonstrated that participants high in need for
closure -- induced by increasing cognitive load - tended to judge an ambiguous target in terms of primed
traits, whereas participants high in need to avoid closure - induced by emphasizing the importance of
accurate judgments -- tended to base judgments less in terms of primed traits. Other studies have
provided additional evidence of the effects of epistemic motivations on the use of accessible constructs in
social judgment (e.g., Heaton & Kruglanski, 1991; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990).
Kunda (1987) has extended the notion of motivated processing by proposing that people
motivated to hold specific beliefs about another person attempt to construct justifications for their desired
beliefs. Thus, individuals often selectively search for, access, and use those beliefs that support their
desired conclusions. Furthermore, their conclusions may be the basis for the construction of new general
beliefs about people and events (Klein & Kunda, 1992). For example, participants motivated to perceive
people with schizophrenia positively expressed more positive stereotypes of that group than less
motivated participants (Klein & Kunda, 1992).
Heuristic processing
,
high in affect-infijsion, is the third AIM information-processing strategy.
Social judges may use heuristic processing when they wish to make a judgment with minimal effort,
taking shortcuts and utilizing only some of the available information. This processing is most likely
when: (a) the target is simple or highly typical, (b) the judgment has low personal relevance, (c) no
specific motivational objectives can be identified, (d) the cognitive capacity of the judge is limited, and
(e) the situation demands little accuracy or careftil scrutiny. Unlike direct access processing, heuristic
processing involves a degree of computation and constructive processing.
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The final processing mechanism, similar to attribute-based processing (Fiske & Neuberg, 1 990),
is called smmmj^r^c^, and necessitates selecting, learning, and interpreting novel infonnation
about a target and relating this information to preexistmg knowledge structures. This processing is likely
when: (a) the target is complex or atypical and (b) the judge has ample cognitive capacity and (c) the
judge has no specific motivated interest besides a desire for accuracy possibly due to implicit or explicit
situational demands.
Although the AIM presents a clear theoretical account of miiial information-processing
strategies, it provides less predictive utility regarding the role of affect on memory retrieval of
infonnation previously processed. Thus, a theory that in many regards complements both the AIM
(Forgas, 1995) and the continuum model of impression formation (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) will be
offered to explain connections between emotional arousal and memory retrieval.
A Theoretical Account of the Relationship Between
Emotional Arousal and Memory Retrieval
While previous researchers have examined the effects ofmood on initial information processing,
the present study investigates the impact of affect on memory retrieval. This study examines how affect
influences people's perceptions and judgments of individuated targets.
Previous research findings suggest that one's level of negative emotional arousal influences both
the probability of retrieving categorical/individuating information from memory and the valence of the
information retrieved. This proposition is based upon four assumptions. First, it assumes that a varietv of
strategies are available for retrieving memorial information. Memories can be retrieved through heuristic,
"short-cut" processes that quickly locate and retrieve easily-accessible information. Memories can also be
retrieved through more "thoughtful," analytic processes that systematically locate and retrieve relevant
attribute-based information. A number of theoretical systems of information processing include this
differentiation between processing strategies (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Forgas, 1995).
The second assumption of the proposition is that people's information retrieval systems operate
economically (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). A fundamental postulate of the "cognitive miser" perspective is
that the less energy exerted on tasks, the more energy available for other, expected or unexpected, tasks.
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People adopt the most effort-minimizing information retrieval strategy that fulfills the requirements of the
task at hand. Because cognitive capacity is a limited resource (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). individuals
often categorize others as members of specific groups, thus obtaining integrated, prior information while
saving processing effort and time. Furthermore, the combination of low attentional capacity and the
heuristic retrieval of information makes one more likely to retrieve category-consistent information. As
mentioned earlier, because categorical information has more and stronger links to attributes than they do
with each other, the category will play a more influential role than any single attribute (Fiske &
Pavelchak, 1986); consequently, categorical information should require less attention to access and
retrieve than weaker individuating information. If a target is important to perceivers, however, they are
more likely to utilize "thoughtful," systematic memory retrieval processes.
Research on arousal and stereotyping supports this assumption. Findings converge to indicate
that arousal reduces attention, making the retrieval of categorical information more likely. For example,
Paulhus et al. (1992) provide evidence suggesting that high arousal increases gender stereotyping.
Furthermore, Paulhus and Lim (1994) suggest that emotional arousal reduces the cognitive complexity of
social perceptions, resulting in polarized evaluations of social targets. In other words, emotional arousal
may make one apt to draw upon categorical person perceptions (such as stereotypes), which are stronger
and have more links than any single attribute connected to the category.
Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994) offer implicit support for this assumption by
emphasizing the adaptive function of stereotyping within the complex social environment. They provide
evidence that stereotype application preserves processing resources. When attentional capacities are
limited by an extreme level of emotional arousal, it seems reasonable that social perceivers may draw on
stereotypic information so as not to overtax the limited capacity of the cognitive processing system.
The third assumption of the proposition is that affect influences the memory retrieval process.
High emotional arousal reduces the capacity to systematically retrieve relevant information from memory
and, by implication, increases the likelihood of heuristic information retrieval processes.
This third assumption is supported by recent research suggesting that positive affect may reduce
the processing of and capacity for information. Worth and Mackie (1987) provide evidence that positive
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mood can reduce systematic processing. Mackie and Worth (1989) found that, when shown persuasive
messages, participants in a neutral mood showed a greater attitude change indicative of systematic
processing than participants in a positive mood. They interpret their results as suggesting that participants
in a positive mood had a reduced cognitive capacity to systematically process information.
Similarly, Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Susser (1994) found that happy people who made
judgments about a case of alleged student misconduct were significantly more likely to offer more severe
judgments about a stereotyped judgment target than were people in a neutral mood. They showed that
happiness can trigger stereotypic judgments more than neutral moods, except when participants are told
that they will be held accountable for their judgments.
The fourth assumption of the proposition is that affect influences the content of the information
retrieved from memory. There are two premises to this assumption. First, because of the ambiguous
nature of social information (e.g., Bruner, 1958), social perception is heavily influenced by what
categorical information pertinent to a given behavior is most accessible and easily activated (Bruner,
1957). Extreme levels of emotional arousal reduce one's capacity to systematically process situational,
social, and self stimuli. This premise is supported by Easterbrook (1959), who postulated that increases
in arousal decrease attentional capacity and magnify salient cues. Therefore, whereas individuals who are
minimally aroused would have a wide perceptual range but poor attentional discrimination, those with
extreme arousal would have a narrow perceptual range. For example, once the young man on the blind
date became infuriated, his perceptual range may have diminished such that, instead of noticing
extraneous details in the social environment (e.g., the hustle-and-bustle of customers), he may have only
perceived salient internal and external social cues (e.g., salient stereotypes).
Individual differences in personality can make some categories more accessible in memory than
others. These personality dimensions are called "chronic," because people are habitually more sensitive
to them (Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For example, some people may typically notice
the friendliness in others, while others may concentrate on people's assertiveness. Chronicity is one
explanation for why different people often describe the same individual differently: Each person may
have different levels of chronic accessibility to different personality dimensions. Thus, the young man on
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*e da.e
.ave possessed chronic accessibn,„ of cenain ca.e,oHes and s,ere„,,pes, paniculari, about
wo^en. However, social perceivers p,edo.,„a„„y on individuating i„fo™a,ion in unambiguous
specific Situations (Kunda & She^an-Willia.s.
,„3,, thus potentially paying little anention to
chronically accessible information.
The second premise of the assumption is that affec.e infonttation that is most accessible and
easily activated heavily influences judgntents. Specific affective states may affect people's emotional .
slant on information retrieved from memo^. For example, if an individual is negatively emotionally
aroused, will that person be more likely to reWeve stereotype-consistent ne,a,.e statements instead of
stereotype.consiste„t;,o.,„v. statements? If so, why? Two prominent, and possibly complementaty
(Forgas, 1 995), explanations for mood effects are affect-priming and affect-as-informa,i„n models. Both
models lend support <o the prediction that anger will enhance the likelihood of evaluating people in
negative ways.
According to pnming models, social perceivers have a tendency to access information consistent
with their mood (e.g., Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984), attend particularly keenly to information consistent with
their mood, and interpret ambiguous information in line with their mood. Consequently, mood-congruent
judgments are apt to occur (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1991). For example, some fmdings indicate that affect
influenced judgments, even when participants were told to maintain a rational judgmental process (see
Forgas & Bower, 1988). Happy or sad participants were asked to judge the likelihood of happy or sad
future events, such as having a car crash, a European holiday, or a nuclear disaster. While participants
were specifically instructed to be as objective in their judgments as possible, their affective states
"dramatically influenced their subjective probability estimates compared with estimates ... by control
participants who were in a neutral mood" (p. 396). Because of preferential priming, making mood-
consistent information more available, mood-consistent judgments have been shown to be produced faster
than inconsistent judgments; also, mood-consistent information can have a greater effect on judgment than
inconsistent information (Forgas & Bower, 1988).
The 'feelings-as-information' model (Schwartz, 1990) suggests that mood-consistent judgments
may occur when social perceivers misattribute the source of their mood to the target of their evaluation.
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upon .ee,ing he. he could Have „isa,.ib.ea *e .ou.e of his .a,
.„„d ,„ .... Thus. Kis a.ecve s,a,e
would have provided evaluative
,„f„™,a„o„ abou,
.he alleged source ,ha,
.iggered his affec.
In summao-. .he proposi.ion predics ,ha. rerteval of ca.eg„,y.c„„sis.e„. i„f„™a.i„„ over
ca.ego^.i„co„sis.e„. infonna.ion is .ore likely if one has a low anen.ional capaci., and u.ilizes heuris.ic
info,™a.ion rerteval processes. Fu„he™ore, re.ieval of
„.,.„v./,.valenced info,™a.ion, such as
nega,ive s,ereo.ypes. is likely when one is „e,an.e,y emo.ionally aroused. Las.ly,
.he proposi.ion holds
when a perceiver relieves informa.ion abou, an ou.group
.arge. ca.egorized as such by salien.
differentiating characteristics.
Predictions Based on the Theoretical Assi.mptinnc
One's level of negative emotional arousal may influence the probability of retrieving category-
consistent and category-inconsistent negatively-valenced information in memory. Thus, a high level of
emotional arousal of anger would trigger access and retrieval of negatively-valenced, category-consistent
information. To offer initial support for the proposition, an experiment used a mixed-design 2 (Affect:
Anger/No Anger) X 2 (Information Rated After Anger Inducement: Category-Consistent/Category-
Inconsistent) X 2 (Category Valence: Positive/Negative).
A number of predicted effects would offer support for the theory about memory retrieval.
The theory predicts a main effect of anger on stereotyping. The angrier participants were, the
more they were expected to stereotype. Stereotyping was indexed by Likert ratings of descriptive,
category-consistent adjectives. Thus, it was expected that:
H 1
:
Angered participants would give higher Likert ratings to category-consistent information
than non-angered participants. (A mean difference was expected.)
Second, although category-consistent information was expected to be more accessible than
category-inconsistent information regardless of affect, there was a predicted main effect of anger on
accessibility of category-consistent information. Category accessibility was measured by how quickly
participants rated category-consistent adjectives. Faster response latencies corresponded to more
accessible information. This led to the expectation that:
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H2: Across affec, co„di,i„„s, ca,ego^.c„„sis,e„, adjecives wouM be ra.ed faster ,ha„ ca,eg„^.
inconsistent adjectives.
H3: Angered participants would rate category-consisten, adjectives faster than non-angered
participants.
Third, because angered individuals had printed negative information, negativelyvalenced
information was expected ,o be more accessible for angered than non-angered people. Thus:
H4: Angered panicipants would rate negativelyvalenced adjectives faster than non-angered
participants.
Fourth, the accessibility of positively-valenced information was expected to have been inhibited
by the priming of negativelyvalenced information, because the priming of negative information was
predicted to cause participants to access negative information before positive information. However,
there was no predicted difference between the accessibiUty of negatively- and positively-valenced
information for non-angered participants. Thus:
H5: There would be an interaction between the valence of information (positive/negative) and
the affect induction effect (anger/no anger) on the time it would take to access category-consistent
information. In other words, it was predicted that in the neutral condition, there would be no mean
difference between ratings of negatively- and positively-valenced adjective latency times; in the anger
condition, negatively-valenced information was expected to be rated faster than positively-valenced
information.
In summary, five hypotheses were outlined in support of the basic proposition that one's level of
negative emotional arousal may influence the probability of retrieving category-consistent and category-
inconsistent negatively-valenced information in memory.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Overview
Participants were told that they would be taking part in a study about the fon^ing of relationships
v.a .nten^et chat rooms." The study was described as investigating whether people's impressions of
another person gathered through written communications were s.milar to the.r v.ews of that person once
they actually meet him or her. Participants were presented with a computer.zed self-description allegedly
written by the other participant. In actuality, the information consisted of standardized paragraphs of
stereotype-consistent and
-mconsistent information about women. After the participant read the
paragraphs, the computer apparently locked up. While the experimenter allegedly attempted to remedy
the broken machine, participants were asked to complete an affect induction procedure for a "professor
down the hall." Participants were randomly allotted to either an anger or neutral mood induction
condition. Once the computer was supposedly fixed, participants completed questiomiaires about the
extent to which they believed different adjectives applied to the alleged other participant, as well as about
their own mood state and their attitudes toward women in general.
Participants
Participants were 54 undergraduate students attending the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst. They received psychology course credit for their participation. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two conditions created by the between-participants variable of affect (anger/no anger).
During the intense debriefing process, experimenters noted six participants who expressed suspicion
regarding the deceptive procedures; two of the participants were in the no anger condition, while the
other four were in the anger condition. These six participants were excluded from analyses.
Consequently, in the anger condition, there were 16 females and 10 males; in the neutral condition, there
were 1 1 females and 1 1 males.
Procedure
Participants arrived at the laboratory independently and were immediately escorted by a female
experimenter into a room with a computer.
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consent
There were four primao- stage. ,o .he experi.e,,,. Kirs,, aOe, c,„„ple,i„g ,hc i„r„r.ed
,
procedures, pa„,cipa„,s were ,„,d ,„a. i„ ,his s.udy, ,he experimenter was in.eres.ed i„ „„d,„g „„, if „eir
impressions of ano.her person .he, would
.ee. .hrough wri..e„ con,.„„ica.io„ (sueh as .hrough in.eme,
cha. roonrs) would be similar
.„ .heir impressions of ,ha, person once ,hey have acually n,e, ,„n,/l,er,
Pa«icipan.s were presen.ed wi.h a eompu.erized sell-descr,p,i„„ allegedly wrinen by ano.her partieipan.
in an adjacen. room. In ac.uali.y,
.he deserip.ion consis.ed of s.a„dardized paragraphs of caregorically-
consisren. and
.inconsis.en. informa.ion abou. women. The experimen.ers emphasized
.ha. since .he
par,ieipan,s were going to mee. each o.her la.er in ,he experimem,
.hey should become as acquain.ed wi.h
.ha. person as possible .hrough ,he personal dcscr.p.ion, a.,emp.i„g
.0 grasp clearly a sense of ,he o,her
person's personality.
Second, after the participants read the information on computer, the computer apparently locked
up. While the experimenter allegedly attempted to retrieve the information necessary to unlock the
computer, participants were asked to complete a short study for a professor "down the hall." All
participants agreed to this task. The bogus study was actually an affect induction. Participants were
randomly assigned an envelope with one of two possible mood manipulations within it: an anger
induction or a neutral affect induction. The directions on the affect induction paper for participants in the
anger condition were to recall an incident in their life histories that made them extremely angry. They
were handed a pencil and paper and were told that they would be given 12 minutes to recall vividly and to
record how the event occurred (see Bodenhausen et al., 1994, and Strack, Schwartz, & Gschneidinger,
1985, for similar manipulations). Participants in the non-anger condition were instructed to recall and
record mundane events in their lives, such as the buildings they passed on the way to classes; these
participants were also allotted precisely 12 minutes to complete the study (Bodenhausen et al., 1994).
After twelve minutes passed, the experimenter returned to the room, collected the affect induction papers,
and successfully "unlocked" the computer.
The third stage of the experiment involved completing questionnaires. Before allegedly meeting
the other participant, participants were asked to respond to a short set of computerized questions. The
first one regarded rating the extent to which different adjectives applied to the alleged other participant;
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target ratings.
The final stage of the experiment involved probing the participants for suspicion and then
debriefing them.
Independent Measures
This study manipulated within-subjects category-consistent and category-inconsistent
information about females. All subjects read both types of information presented on the screen.
More specifically, the target female's personal description comprised a number of paragraphs.
Twelve of the sentences within the description each offered a particular type of categorical or attribute-
based information, varying along the dimensions of stereotype consistency-inconsistency and positive-
negative valence. Specifically, there were two types of category-consistent information provided within
the target description: Three sentences contained information that was positive and consistent with the
stereotypes of the target's gender (e.g., "1 am caring"); another three sentences contained information that
was negative and consistent with the stereotypes of the target's gender (e.g., "1 am nosy"). There were two
^Pes of category-inconsistent information provided within each target description: Three sentences
contained information that was positive and inconsistent with the stereotypes of the target's gender (e.g., "I
am ambitious"). Three sentences contained information that was negative and inconsistent with the
stereotypes of the target's gender (e.g., "I'm hot-tempered").
Dependent Measures
There were three dependent variables: (a) the amount of time for participants to rate each of the
fictitious other participant's qualities, (b) participants' ratings of the fictitious other participant's
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Manipulatinn ThprVs
The effectiveness of the affect induction manipulation is unclear. Participants rated their
emotional state in relation to clusters of adjectives developed by Epstein (.979). An ANOVA comparing
participants' affect self-ratings with their affect induction condition revealed no significant results, F
(1,46) = .094, E = .76. Several reasons will be discussed later supporting the notion that the affect
induction may nonetheless have been initially effective.
Assessing Chrnnir Attitudes Toward Women
The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Click & Fiske, 1996) was not used as a covariate in the
analysis of hypotheses for two reasons. First, participants' inventory ratings were found to vary
depending upon which experimenter ran the experiment at the time, F (2,42), p = .068. Second, a t-test of
condition (anger/neutral affect) on ASI scores revealed a significant effect, F (1,43) = 6.02, p =
.018; this
analysis discounted one extreme outlier (i.e., participant #44, whose studentized residual =
-3.74). As
shown in Table 2, the affect induction influenced females' ASI scores, but not men's ASI scores. Females
in the neutral condition responded to ASI questions in a less sexist way than males and females in the
anger condition and males in the neutral condition.
Table 2. Mean ASI Scores of Females and Males in the Anger and Neutral Affect Induction Conditions.
ANGER NEUTRAL
FEMALES 3.4 2.9
MALES 3.6 3.5
Hypotheses Analyzed
Hypothesis One
Findings partially support the first hypothesis, which predicted a main effect for affect, such that
angered participants would rate category-consistent information higher than non-angered participants. An
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inuial analysis of a gender X condUion (anger vs. „e„a, affec) ANOVA on ,he ca.ego^-consis.en,
adjecive ratings revealed no signincan, r.ndings, F ( ,,44)H .3 1
,
« >
.0. However, because of .he s.all
n wi,hi„ ,Kis srndy ,n=4S,, which can .a.e a .i„i„al nn.ber of ex.e.e responses high,, i„n„e„ce
.he
resuhs, ,he ANOVA was recalcula.ed wi.hon, a„ ex.e.e on.her ,i.., pa„icipa„, «4S, whose s,„de„,ized
residual was 3.605). The resuhs brough. forth a marginal,, s,g„if,can, in.erac.ion of gender by condi.ion
on ca.egoo-co„sis.en. adjecive ra.ings, F (1,43) = 3.43, p < .08. As predicted, males in .he anger
condition rated category-consistent information higher dtan males in .he neutral condi.ion (Ms=4,2 and
3,9, respecively). Interestingly, women responded in an opposite manner: Women in the anger condition
rated categoiy-consis.en. informa.ion lower than women in the neutral condition (Ms=3,9 and 4.1,
respectively; see Figure 1).
Female Male
CONSTER CONSTER
0 1
CONDITON
0 1
coNDrroN
Figure 1
.
Comparison of condition and gender on category-consistent adjective ratings (excluding the
outlier). Condition 0 is the anger induction condition, and Condition 1 is the neutral induction condition.
As a side point, it should be mentioned that an ANOVA was performed comparing the participant ratings
of the category-consistent information in a design with participant gender and experimenter. The findings
approached significance, F (2,42)= 3.02, p < .06, reflecting that the results may have been dependent upon
which of the three experimenters conducted the experiment at the time. For example, one of the
experimenters appeared to elicit greater category-consistent adjective ratings (on a 6-point scale) from
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ma,epar.ic,pa„,s(M
= 4.5,.c„.pa„so„.„.,era,,„,s.„..a,epa„ic,a„.^
experimenters (Ms = 3.6 and 4.0).
Hypothesis Two
The second hypothesis predicted ,ha, across affec, conditions, categoty-consistent adjectives
shonid be rated faster than category-inconsistent adjectives. A paired t-tes. comparing category-consistent
and category-inconsistent latency times revealed a statistically significant difference,
, (47)= 2,69, p
,010, However, the difference was contrary to expectations. The response time to the category-consistent
words (M = 4 1 79 ms) was greater than the response time to the catego^-mconsis.ent latency times (M =
3620 ms). Nevertheless, methodological challenges may have impeded a valid assessment of hypothesis
two, as will be discussed later.
Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis 3 predicted that angered participants should rate category-consistent adjectives faster
than non-angered participants. An ANOVA of gender by condition on category-consistent adjective
rating times revealed a statistically significant interaction effect, F (1,44)= 5.167, p < .03 (see Figure 2).
Contraiy to expectations, the male participants in the anger condition rated category-consistent adjectives
slower than males in the neutral condition (Ms = 4615 ms and 3683 ms, respectively; see Table 3).
However, female participants in the anger condition rated category-consistent adjectives faster than
females in the neutral condition, as the hypothesis predicted {Ms = 3863 ms and 4737 ms, respectively).
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Female
Male
5567
4662
5567
4662
CATCONS
3757
2852
CATCONS
3757 -
0 1
coNDrriON
2852
0 1
CONDmON
Table 3. Results ofANOVA of Gender by Condition on Category-Consistent Adjective Rating
ms).
Times (in
ANGER NEUTRAL
FEMALES 3863 4737
MALES 4615 3683
Experimenter factors again may have influenced the results. An analysis comparing
experimenter by gender on the category-consistent latency times revealed marginally significant results (F
(2,41) = 2.35, p < . 1 1) when discounting one outlier (i.e., participant #4, whose studentized residual =
3.77). As seen in Table 4, male participants run by Experimenter 1 were more likely to pay attention to
stereotype-consistent behaviors than female participants run by Experimenter 1 (Ms = 4553 ms and 3740
ms, respectively). Perhaps different experimenters incidentally primed stereotype-consistent or
inconsistent cognitions due to their behaviors, personalities, appearances, and so on (discussed later).
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Table 4. Comparison of Experimenter by Gender on Category-Cons
i
Latencies.
istent Adjective Rating Time
txperimenter 1 Experimenter 2 Experimenter 3
Female 3740 4690 4464
Male 4553 3530 4200
Further evidence of the effects of experimenter factors on the data can be seen in the results of an
ANOVA of experimenter X gender on categoi^-inconsistent response times, which revealed significant
findings, F (2,4
1
)= 6. 1 99, p < .025. (One outlier, participant #40, was excluded from this analysis
because of the participant's extreme studentized residual of 4.73.) As shown in Table 5, male participants
rtin by Experimenter 1, on average, attended more to stereotype-inconsistencies, while female participants
mn by Experimenter 1, on average, attended less to stereotype-inconsistencies.
Table 5. Comparison of Experimenter by Gender on Category-Inconsistent Adjective Rating Time
Latencies (Discounting One Outlier)
Experimenter 1 Experimenter 2 Experimenter 3
Female 2870 3895 3984
Male 4272 3461 3537
Hypothesis Four
Hypothesis 4 predicted that angered participants should rate negatively-valenced adjectives faster
than non-angered participants. Testing the interaction between condition by gender on negatively-
valenced adjective latency times revealed a significant interaction effect, F (1,44)= 4.78, p =.034 (see
Figure 3). Negatively-valenced adjective response times were different for males and females within the
two conditions. In the anger condition, males took longer (M = 4296 ms) to rate negatively-valenced
adjectives than females (M = 3500 ms). In the neutral condition, males took less time (M = 3571 ms) than
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women, but not for men.
5274 0
4772 2
4270 4
NEGVAL
3768 6
3266 8 -
2765 0
Female
0 1
CONDmON
5274 0
47722
4270 4
NEGVAL
3768 6
3266 8 -
2765 0
Male
0 1
coNDrriON
rZ'^
^"^^^'•i^"" of condition by gender on the negatively-valenced adj ective latency timesCondition 0 ,s the anger induction condition, and Condition 1 is the neutral induction condition
was
Hypothesis Five
Hypothesis 5 predicted an interaction between the valence of information (i.e., whether it
positive or negative) and the affect induction condition (i.e., anger vs. neutral) on the time it takes to
access category-consistent information. This interaction was not significant, F ( 1 ,46) = 1 .4 1 , p = .24
However, as reported in hypothesis 3, there was a significant interaction between condition and gend.
over all of the negative and positive category-consistent latency times, F (1,44)= 5.167, p < .03. Testing
hypothesis 5, though, revealed no significant gender by condition interactions on negative and positive
category-consistent information. Thus, females and males responded differently to category-consistent
information regardless of whether the information was positive or negative (see Table 6 for cell means).
er
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Table 6
Mean Caparisons of .he Amoun, of Tin,e „ Took For Males and Fe.ales ,„ Ra,e Positive and Negative
MereotvDic Informatinn in tVio Av,„„— j xi_ . , _ "
Category-Consistent Information
(Stereotvpesl
Positive Negative
Female Male Female Male
Anger 3932 4427 3793 4802
Neutral 4449 3520 5025 3844
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CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
A substantial body of research findings indicates ,ha, affec, can e.e« po«rM effects on
subsequent itnpression fon^ation (e g,, Bodet^ausen. Sheppard, ^ ,<,a.et. 1,94; Fiske & Pavelchak
19B6; Forgas, „92b), present study extends this previous wor. by showing that affect can influence
the probability of retrieving categoty-consistent and category-inconsistent negativelyvalenced
information already stored in memory.
Initially, it was proposed that affect would simply and non-differentially influence the probabiHty
of retrieval of particular types of information front memory. However, the present experiment's flndings
brought forth a much more complex role for affect. Two broad theoretically signiflcam fmdings emerged
from the data.
Theorv-Relevanf Finding One:
Latency in Responding to Stereotyp ic Information
The first theoretically significant finding regarded the time for participants to respond to
stereotypic information. As the theoiy relating affect and social impression formation predicted
(discussed earlier in the paper), female participants in the anger condition rated the target more quickly
than female participants in the neutral condition. However, male participants in the anger condition
unexpectedly rated the target more slowly than male participants in the neutral condition.
The unexpected responses of male participants may be due to two related factors: the
effectiveness of the anger induction and censorship
. The anger induction was intended to induce strong,
negative emotional arousal for participants within the anger condition. The induction was expected to
cause participants to feel fairly angered, "out of control," and, to a moderate degree, passive victims of
their emotions. The anger induction was also expected to cause enough emotional arousal that
participants' cognitive capacities would be quite limited.
The anger induction did not seem to live fully up to its name, though. On the basis of
experimenters' behavioral observations, it appears that participants in the anger condition were negatively
emotionally-aroused, but only to a minimal degree. By extension, one could infer that participants in the
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ange. condUion fel, .i„i™„y „„ „f
„e.e„heless had a fair a.„„„. of cognitive capacity
available for information process.g. Therefore, instead of exening a large, distracting, linriting effect
participants, negative feelings
.ay have acted mainly as directive behavioral info^ation (Schwa„z,
.990,. That is, instead of merely clouding panicipants- Judgments as expected, the minimal ento.iona,
arousal may have Auctioned both as a subjective indicator of negative feelings toward s„n,ethin„ or
someone and as a mot.vat.ng
.mpetus for behavior (e.g., censorship). Thus, negative emotional arousal
may have provided participants with mformation about their present situation; without experiencing
cognitive overload, participants could have used this affective information to their behavioral advantage,
ifmotivated to do so. As will be discussed later, female and male participants may have been
differentially motivated in how to respond to the experiment's questionnaires.
An example may help to clarify the level of emotional arousal participants apparently felt, as well
as the psychological implications of that arousal on social judgments. Imagine a woman flying in through
the front door after having had a very long and stressftil day at work. Her husband greets her with a kiss
and a tedious question concerning tax forms. One can only imagine the unblushing words that might pop
out of the wife's mouth in response to her husband's question. In this instance, due to her high level of
emotional arousal, the wife would have virtually no cognitive capacity for processing additional
information. Her state of extreme emotional arousal would be analogous with the originally expected
affective and behavioral state hoped to have been produced by the affect induction utilized within this
study.
Now picture the same incident again, only this time after the wife has had a minimally stressfiil
day at work. After the husband fires his question, the wife may have thoughts such as, "What a husband!
Can't he see that I'm tired. Can't he understand that I've had a long day!" However, with cognitive
capacity still available and not taken up by extreme levels of emotional arousal, the wife may not respond
in line with her thoughts. Rather, she may pause and respond, "I've had a long day. Give me a few
minutes to unwind and then we'll figure things out." In this latter instance, the wife, just like the angered
participants in the present study, has a general awareness of negative feelings, but nevertheless has the
cognitive capacity to process the situation, censor her thoughts, and behave appropriately. In essence, the
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wife, similar ,o the angered participams, is aware ,ha, her negative feelings could potentially affee, her
judgntems and behaviors; she thus ean utilize a socially appropriate infonnation processing strategy to
censor her misguided thoughts.
Similarly, some participants may have censored their thoughts. The experimental design
obligated participants to answer rapidly questions about the alleged other participant. Thus, minimally-
aroused participants in the anger condition may have had negative feelings, cognitive capacity for social
information processing, and situational demands for quickly answering questionnaire questions.
Therefore, male participants in the anger condition may have rapidly censored Xht\x thoughts in
compensation for the automatically-accessible negative thoughts retrieved due to the negative arousal.
Censoring is defined not as suppressing a thought for a more appropriate thought, but rather more broadly
as accessing a less typical (i.e., less accessible) schema for processing information.
With this basic understanding of the cognitive processes affecting angered participants, one
plausible explanation for why angered male participants rated the target slower than male participants in
the neutral condition becomes apparent: Male participants in the anger condition may have censored
their schemas, drawing on less-typical schemas for rating the female target.
The censored ratings made by the male participants in the anger condition proved to be more
extremely stereotypic than the ratings of the male participants in the neutral condition. At first glance, this
finding may seem to undermine the theory regarding male censorship, for one would assume that after
censoring, the ratings of male participants in the two conditions would be roughly equivalent. Closer
scrutiny, though, reveals a different story.
It appears that there may be a hierarchy of potential schemas for processing information: The
more emotionally aroused one is, the less complex the range of schemas accessible for information
processing. When one has a high level of emotional arousal, one may be likely to process information
rapidly, utilizing generalized, simplified schemas. When one has a low level of emotional arousal (e.g.,
when one is in a serious and concentrative mood), one may be likely to process information effortfully and
deliberately; thus, a larger number of schemas may be available for information processing. Most
pertinent for our discussion, when one has a moderate level of emotional arousal, one's level of
27
motivation may hdp de,e™i„e
.he number and complexity ofsche^as accessible for processing
info^arion: Tbe more n,o„va,ed one is, ,he more sopKis,ica,ed and abundant are the accessible sehe.as,
.*m^ Thus, ™,e participants in the anger condition may have been more motivated to access socially
appropriate schemas than male participants in the neutral condition; however, due to their higher levels of
emotional arousal, they ntay have had a less complex range of schemas available for information
processing.
Furtiiermore, assuming that male participants in the neutral condition did not draw on subsidiary
schemas, it logically follows that male participants in the neutral condition would take less time to rate
stereotypes. They had no negative emotional arousal, and thus had no subjective indication or reason to
censor their thoughts.
To clarify, let us reexamine the anecdote about the wife walking in through the front door after a
minimally stressful day. Her moderate level of emotional arousal would dictate the range of schemas
available for responding to her husband's tax question. For example, in her moderately emotional state,
the wife may have retrieved from memory two schemas for reacting to her husband: (1) To respond in an
exasperated manner and (2) to respond in a moderately resfrained, polite manner. Importantly, it would
have been highly unlikely that the wife would have responded in a perfectly polite and responsive manner:
Within her moderately aroused state, such schemas simply would not have fallen within the range of easily
accessible schemas.
Additional evidence of censorship by males is provided by their unexpected tardiness in
responding to negative adjectives when angered. Angered male participants may have taken the extra
time necessary to censor their thoughts about negative adjectives directed toward the target female.
Gender Differences in Censorship:
Invocation of Ingroup/Outgroup Effects
Why would the men, and not the women, censor? As outgroup members rating a woman, men
were more likely to be fearful of behaving in a manner offensive to the other group. For example, they
may have been fearful that either the alleged other participant would discover their answers or the female
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experimenter would perceive them negatively. More stereotypic thoughts may have been quickly and
automatically accessible to men; however, because of other motives, such as the desire to appear socially
appropriate and "politically correct" in their views about women, they may have taken the extra
processing time to think past their knee-jerk stereotypic responses. On the other hand, female participants
were rating an ingroup member and, therefore, felt little fear of behaving inappropriately. As is the
protocol within many ingroup interactions, there is often an unwritten social rule that same-group
members can insult and tease each other about stereotypic group characteristics without detrimental social
or personal repercussions. For example, some Jews believe it is acceptable only for Jews to label an
arrogant, wealthy Jewish female a "Jewish American Princess." Similarly, within the present study,
females may have felt little anxiety or fear of offending the alleged female target with an off-key rating.
Additional evidence for female participants not needing to censor was provided by the pattern of
their time latencies to negatively-valenced information: Female participants in an angry state took less
time to rate negative adjectives than female participants in a neutral state. In the anger condition, female
participants, unlike male participants, may have felt little external pressure to avoid rating the female
target in socially-inappropriate ways. Conversely, in the neutral condition, females may have had a
greater amount of cognitive capacity available for making a more accurate target assessment, considering
both category-consistent and category-inconsistent information.
Theory-Relevant Finding Two:
The Valence of Stereotypic Information
A second theoretically significant finding regarded the valence of participants' ratings of
stereotypic information. As the theory relating affect and social impression formation predicted
(explained earlier in the paper), male participants in the anger condition rated stereotypes of the target
more extremely than male participants in the neutral condition. Men in the angry condition may have had
less cognitive capacity for retrieving stereotype-inconsistent information, thus accessing mainly
stereotype-consistent information when judging the female target.
Female participants in the anger condition rated the target less extremely than female participants
in the neutral condition. One explanation for this finding is that female participants may have attended
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more to category-consistent than category-inconsistent infom^ation about the target. More specif.cally,
they may have more effortfully processed information consistent w.th the stereotypes of the category
"woman." Thus, category-consistent information in memory would have been more accessible to them
than category-inconsistent information. Consequently, in the anger condition, female participants would
have had limited cognitive capacity, which would have constrained the potential amount of inconsistent
information available to make an accurate judgment of the target. Therefore, female participants in the
anger condition would have been apt to make less extreme ratings than female participants in the neutral
condition.
Furthermore, although motivation could have facilitated a more balanced view of the target,
female participants in the anger condition were only minimally motivated to retrieve stereotype-
inconsistent information about the target. Female participants could have been more motivated if, similar
to the male participants' perceptions, they felt that their uncensored views of women could in some way
be perceived as socially inappropriate.
Meanwhile, female participants in the neutral condition rated the target more extremely than
female participants in the anger condition. Unlike female participants in the anger condition, those in the
neutral condition had more cognitive capacity for retrieving stereotype-inconsistent information.
The Big Picture:
The Study's Overall Theoretical Significance
Overall, this study revealed three general findings that have important theoretical implications
regarding the role of affect in social impressions. First and most fundamentally, affect influenced both
recall speed and the extremity of ratings of information about a person one had already individualized.
That is, while past studies tried to empirically discover the effects of emotion on initial processing (e.g.,
Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Paulhus & Lim, 1994), the present experiment showed that if a
person already had an attribute-based view of another person, anger affected retrieval of that information.
Participants' response latency and ratings varied in patterned ways depending upon whether they were in
the anger or neutral condition. Regardless of the patterns of variation, that a difference between angered
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and neutral participants existed accents the importance of including affect in current models of social
information processing.
A second general finding of theoretical importance was that group membership affected
participants' perceptions of a previously-individualized person, depending upon whether the target was a
member of the same or a different group than the social judge. Group membership effects were shown in
that participants' gender significantly affected ratings of a female target. Ingroup members (i.e., females)
tended to rate the ingroup target differently than outgroup members (i.e., males).
Third, the priming of negative information via the anger induction appeared to facilitate recall of
negative cognitions about a previously-individualized person (under certain conditions). Priming of
negative information appeared to increase the likelihood that angered females recalled stereotypic
information, as compared with neutral females. Conversely, though, priming of negative information did
not increase the likelihood that angered males would recall stereotypic information, as compared with
neutral males.
A Critique of Theorv and Methodologv
Within this study, several theoretical and methodological issues needed to be clarified or
changed. First, the concept of emotional arousal needed to be more specifically defined for theoretical
and methodological reasons. In particular, to what precisely did the term "anger" refer? Within the
current experiment, anger was assumed to be a fi-ee-floating, negatively-felt arousal state with concomitant
cognitive components. However, can anger be free-floating, or does there need to be a specific object to
which anger is targeted? Perhaps the results of this study might have been different had participants been
angry at the specific person whom they were rating. Future theoretical and empirical work should look at
this issue.
Second, the degree of effectiveness of the affect induction was unclear. In future research, once
a clear reconceptualization of anger is completed, it is imperative to use an affect induction technique that
is both reliable and valid. That is, the technique must be able to induce all participants into a
demonstrably approximately equal affective state, and multiple measures should be used to assess the
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subjective validity of the state. In the future, the use of several different measures to assess participants'
affective states would allow converging evidence regarding participants' levels of emotional arousal. It is
suggested that one of the measures be experimenters' predictions about which condition they think
participants have been placed. Furthennore, not only should the affect induction be reliable and valid, but
it should also induce participants into a predetermined level of emotional arousal. For example, does the
experiment call for participants to be slightly bitter, angry, or utterly enraged? Unfortunately, in the
current experiment, participants appeared not to be induced into as extreme a level of emotional arousal a.
deemed necessary for a completely accurate assessment of the hypotheses tested.
However, there are several prominent reasons why the affect induction may still have worked
effectively. First, because the affect self-rating was not administered immediately after the affect
induction, the affect induction may have declined during the time lapse between the manipulation and the
self-rating. Second, although blind to which affect induction condition participants were in,
experimenters reported being able to determine participants' condition, based upon behavioral
observations. In fact, two of the experimenters reported nearly 100% accuracy with their guesses about
condition placement of participants they ran. No formal assessment measures were used to gather this
information, though. Third, the affect induction may not have been powerftil enough to produce
reportable differences in mood without more sensitive measures. Additionally, the Likert-styled scale
used with Epstein's affect induction check (1979) may not have been sensitive enough to detect
participant variations in ratings. In particular, while participants self-rated adjective clusters on a scale
from 1 -6, the scale could have more sensitively detected mood variations if the range of possible rating
points was larger (e.g., if the scale were from 1-100, more subtle mood variations may have been
detected). Fourth, the adjectives participants rated on the mood checklist may have provoked reactivity,
thus confounding mood self-ratings. For example, one of the clusters on the adjective checklist included
the word "anger." In pilot work examining anger and social judgments, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found
that on a self-rating questionnaire, "angry" proved to be too reactive a term, producing floor effects in
self-ratings; they decided to use the word "irritated" as a substitution. Thus, in future work related to
emotion, affect self-rating scales should be pilot-tested to guard against participant reactivity. Fifth, the
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affect induction may have been confounded by experimenter. There was a marginally significant mood by
experimenter imeraction. signifying the possible confounding influence of individual experimenter's
behavior, appearance, and so forth, on participants' affective states.
A third issue that warrants further empirical and theoretical attention is the extent to which
different experimenters may have exerted different effects not only on participants' affective states, but
also on their entire subjective experiences within the experiment. Certain experimenters' behaviors,
mannerisms, levels of attraction, and so on, may have primed different chronic and short-term cognitions
and facilitated or inhibited specific affective states. In the f\,ture, at least two possible ways to avoid large
variation in experimenter influence on the data are recommended. One route is to identify one reliable
experimenter to be granted full responsibility for rumiing participants. A second route is to select several
qualified people to run pilot work. Analyze the pilot work, and choose the experimenters for whom there
is no unusual or unexpected experimenter effects on the data to run the actual experiment.
Lastly, some of the unexpected findings can be contested on methodological grounds. For
example, hypothesis two predicted that across affect conditions, category-consistent adjectives would be
rated faster than category-inconsistent adjectives. However, the resulting difference in time latencies
between ratings of the category-consistent and category-inconsistent adjectives may have been due not to
actual differences in the accessibility of information, but rather to at least two potential differences in the
content of the stimulus words. First, the category-consistent adjectives being rated may have been less
like their synonym counterparts than the category-inconsistent adjectives; thus, the category-consistent
adjectives may have been less primed and more quickly accessible. Second, the time to read the category-
inconsistent words may have been less than that of the category-consistent words, influencing the longer
latency period. For example, the category-inconsistent words may have been less familiar or more
difficult vocabulary words to participants.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, this study was designed to discover the impact of affect on the retrieval of
previously-processed social information in memory. The results suggested that affect indeed infiuenced
the content and process of memory retrieval. Participant gender appeared to be a major influence on
memory retrieval processes of a female target. In general, the data suggested that ingroup participants in
the anger condition rated an ingroup target faster and less extremely than ingroup participants in the
neutral condition; conversely, outgroup participants in the anger condition rated a target slower and more
extremely than outgroup participants in the neutral condition.
Years and years of research on the intertwined relationship between cognition and affect have
yielded theoretically and practically significant findings. Research will eventually be advanced enough to
pinpoint the multitude of social influences affecting people's behaviors in places as diverse as business
offices and coffee houses.
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